Empirical cross-industry cross-country models are applied widely in economics, for example to investigate the determinants of economic growth or international trade. Estimation generally relies on US proxies for unobservable technological industry characteristics, for example industries' dependence on external finance or relationship-specific inputs. We examine the properties of the estimator and find that estimates can be biased towards zero (attenuated) or away from zero (amplified), depending on how technological similarity with the US covaries with other country characteristics. We also develop an alternative estimator that yields a lower bound on the true effect in cross-industry cross-country models of comparative advantage.
Introduction
Recent empirical work in macroeconomics and international trade has relied extensively on cross-industry cross-country models that relate cross-country di¤erences in industry performance -industry growth or industry exports for example -to an interaction between (i) country characteristics like …nancial development, institutional quality, or human capital endowments and (ii) industry characteristics like external-…nance dependence, the complexity of production, or skill intensity. The approach has proven useful for examining a surprisingly wide variety of interesting economic questions, brie ‡y reviewed below. Two strands of research stand out. First, following Rajan and Zingales (1998) , cross-industry cross-country models have been used to examine how economic growth and development is a¤ected by …nancial development, property rights protection, contract enforcement, and human capital endowments. Second, building on Romalis (2004) and subsequent theoretical contributions in international trade, cross-industry cross-country models have served as the basis for empirical studies of the e¤ect of factor endowments and institutions on comparative advantage (for a review, see Nunn and Tre ‡er, 2014) . For example, Nunn (2007) uses the approach to show that better contract enforcement is a source of comparative advantage in industries that use relationship-speci…c inputs more intensively.
Because there is little industry data for most countries, the cross-industry cross-country literature generally treats the relevant technological industry characteristics -for example, external-…nance dependence in Rajan and Zingales (1998) or relationship-speci…c input intensity in Nunn (2007) -as unobservable and employs proxies from a benchmark country, typically the United States (US). Another reason for using US industry data to obtain proxies for the relevant industry characteristics is that technological industry characteristics must be inferred from industry behavior, which is likely to yield more reliable results in countries where markets are not too distorted. Our goal here is to understand the widely used crossindustry cross-country estimator and formally analyze the implications of using data from a benchmark country to proxy unobservable technological industry characteristics.
Our starting point is an empirical framework that encompasses the cross-industry crosscountry models in the literature. A basic feature of the framework is that the technological characteristics of industries may be more similar for some pairs of countries than others (e.g., Bernard and Jones, 1996; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Schott, 2004; Caselli, 2005) .
We then show that the benchmarking estimator used in the cross-industry cross-country literature is subject to a bias shaped by two countervailing forces. Unsurprisingly, proxying the technological industry characteristics of countries using data from a benchmark country may result in a bias toward zero (an attenuation bias). The reasoning is similar to that of the classical measurement error bias. But benchmarking may also result in a bias away from zero, which we refer to as ampli…cation bias. The ampli…cation bias can be very strong if technologically similar countries are similar in other dimensions. 1 A main area of application of cross-industry cross-country models is international trade, where these models have been used to examine the e¤ect of factor endowments and institutions on comparative advantage (e.g. Romalis, 2004; Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007; Cuñat and Melitz, 2012; Krishna and Levchenko, 2013; Manova, 2013) . We show that in this context there is a benchmarking estimator that is biased towards zero and therefore yields a lower bound on the true e¤ect, as long as some countries di¤er in the direction of their comparative advantage. We illustrate this estimator by applying it to Nunn's (2007) study of the e¤ect of contract enforcement on comparative advantage in industries that depend more on relationship-speci…c intermediate inputs.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Next we brie ‡y review some of the applications of the cross-industry cross-country approach. Section 2 examines the estimator used in the cross-industry cross-country literature. Section 3 develops the alternative estimator that yields a lower bound on the true e¤ect in models of comparative advantage and illustrates the estimator in the context of Nunn (2007) . Section 4 concludes.
Some Applications of the Cross-Industry Cross-Country Approach The crossindustry cross-country approach is widely used in economics and our brief review here is only meant to illustrate the range of empirical applications. See Appendix Table 1 for a summary of the variety of applications.
Many applications of the cross-industry cross-country approach investigate the e¤ects of …nancial markets on economic growth, …rm entry and exit, investment, and innovation (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Fisman and Love, 2003, 2007; Braun and Larrain, 2005; Aghion, Fally, and Scarpetta, 2007; Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine, 2008; Brown, Martinson, and Petersen, 2013; Hsu, Tian, and Xu, 2014; Calomiris, Larrain, Liberti, and Sturgess, 2016) .
The cross-industry cross-country approach has been widely used to examine the determinants of international trade and industrial specialization. Nunn (2007) , Levchenko (2007) , and subsequent works show that institutionally advanced countries tend to specialize in sec-1 It is tempting to think of the ampli…cation bias as a simple omitted variable bias, but there are di¤erences that make this analogy less useful. For example, the two forces determining the bias of the benchmarking estimator result in either ampli…cation or attenuation. In contrast, the simple omitted variable bias is either upwards or downwards. Nevertheless, the bias of the benchmarking estimator can -just like the classical measurement error bias -be understood as a nonstandard omitted variable bias. tors that rely on di¤erentiated intermediate inputs (see also Ranjan and Lee, 2007; Ferguson and Formai, 2013; Nunn and Tre ‡er, 2014) . Manova (2008 Manova ( , 2013 links …nancial development to the patterns of international trade (see also Chan and Manova, 2015; Manova, Wei, and Zhang, 2015) . Building on Romalis (2004) , Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009) show that countries with an educated workforce tend to specialize in human capital intensive sectors. The cross-industry cross-country approach has also been used to investigate the e¤ect of product and labor market institutions on comparative advantage, productivity, entrepreneurship, and innovation (e.g., Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2007; Cingano, Leonardi, Messina, and Pica, 2010; Cuñat and Melitz, 2012; Tang, 2012; Gri¢ th and Macartney, 2014) . And recent works have employed the cross-industry cross-country approach to study the e¤ects of environmental protection laws and water supply on comparative advantage (Broner, Bustos, and Carvalho, 2015; Debaere, 2015) .
Other applications of the cross-industry cross-country approach investigate a variety of di¤erent economic issues. For example, the driving forces of outsourcing, foreign direct investment, and the fragmentation of production (e.g., Alfaro and Charlton, 2009; Carluccio and Fally, 2012; Basco, 2013; Blyde and Danielken, 2015; Paunov, 2016) . The cross-industry cross-country approach has also been used to examine the economic consequences of crosscountry di¤erences in …rm size distributions, entry regulation, transaction costs, risk sharing possibilities, skill dispersion, and foreign aid in ‡ows (e.g. Pagano and Schivardi, 2003; Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan, 2006; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton, 2009; Rajan and Subramanian, 2010; Aizenman and Sushko, 2011; Bombardini, Gallipoli, and Pupato, 2012; Michelacci and Schivardi, 2013; Larrain, 2014; Aghion, Howitt, and Prantl, 2014) . Recent applications use the cross-industry cross-country setup to assess the e¤ects of …nancial crises on macroeconomic performance and international trade (e.g. Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan, 2008; Iacovone and Zavacka, 2009; Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy, 2010; Claessens, Tong, and Wei, 2012; Laeven and Valencia, 2013) and to examine the e¤ects of …scal and monetary policy over the business cycle (e.g. Aghion, Farhi, and Kharroubi, 2013; Aghion, Hemous, and Kharroubi, 2014) .
Variations of the cross-industry cross-country approach have been employed to examine the economic e¤ects of di¤erences in …nancial development, institutional quality and trust across regions and over time (e.g. Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; Bertrand, Schoar, and Tesmar, 2007; Hsieh and Parker, 2007; Aghion, Askenazy, Berman, Cette, and Eymar, 2012; Fafchamps and Schündeln, 2013; Feenstra, Hong, Ma, and Spencer, 2013; Duygan-Bump, Levkov, and Montoriol-Garriga, 2015; Jacobson and von Schedvin, 2015; Cingano and Pinotti, 2016) .
The Benchmarking Bias

Empirical Framework
The basis of cross-industry cross-country models are theories linking outcomes for industries in di¤erent countries to an interaction between country characteristics and technological industry characteristics. For example, in Rajan and Zingales (1998) , the outcome variable is industry growth and the interaction is between country-level …nancial development and the external-…nance dependence of industries. In Nunn (2007), the outcome variable is industry exports and the interaction is between country-level contract enforcement and the intensity with which industries use relationship-speci…c inputs. As the main theoretical prediction concerns the e¤ect of the interaction between country and industry characteristics, crossindustry cross-country models allow controlling for country and industry …xed e¤ects. An empirical framework that encompasses the models used in the cross-industry cross-country literature is
where y in is the outcome in industry i = 1; ::; I and country n = 1; ::; N ; x n the relevant country characteristic; and z in the relevant industry characteristic. The n and i denote country and industry …xed e¤ects and v in unobservable determinants of the outcome. The parameter of interest is the coe¢ cient on the industry-country interaction, . We take v in to be distributed independently of z in and x n to abstract from omitted variable and reverse causation issues. We also assume that v in has a …nite variance and E(v in jn) = E(v in ji) = 0,
and take x n to be given with X N n=1 (x n x) 2 > 0 where x is the average of x n .
Estimation of in (1) would be straightforward if there were data on the technological industry characteristics z in for a broad set of countries. But detailed industry data are unavailable for most countries. Moreover, the cross-industry cross-country literature often focuses on technological industry characteristics that are not directly observable and must therefore be inferred from industry behavior. Such inference is likely to be more reliable in countries where markets are not too distorted. In practice, z in is generally proxied using industry data from a benchmark country, almost always the US.
It is therefore important to understand whether in (1) can be estimated using industry characteristics from a benchmark country as a proxy for z in . For such a benchmarking estimator to stand a chance, there must be some global element to an industry's technological characteristics. At the same time, it seems unreasonable to presume that industries use the same technology in all countries, as the optimal technology choice depends on many factors that vary across countries (e.g., Bernard and Jones, 1996; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Schott, 2004; Caselli, 2005) . We therefore model the industry characteristics z in in (1) as the sum of a global industry characteristic (z i ) and a country-speci…c industry characteristic
with variance V ar(z ) and independent of other elements of the model. 2
The country-speci…c industry characteristics " in allow us to capture that industry characteristics may be more similar for some country-pairs than others in a simple way. We assume E(" in jn) = E(" in ji) = 0; E(" 2 in jn) = 2 ; E(" in " jm jn; m) = 0 for all industries i 6 = j; and the following correlation of idiosyncratic industry characteristics for country pairs n 6 = m (3)
Corr(" in " im jn; m) = mn .
Hence, the correlation of industry characteristics z in for country pairs n 6 = m is
Corr(z in ; z im jn; m) can be interpreted as an index of technological similarity and country pairs with greater mn are therefore more similar technologically.
The Bias
As data on the technological industry characteristics z in are unavailable for a broad set of countries, the cross-industry cross-country literature proceeds using a proxy from a benchmark country. We refer to this proxy as z iU S as the benchmark country is almost always the US. Hence, the equation estimated in the cross-industry cross-country literature is (5) y in = a n + a i + bx n z iU S + residual in where a n and a i stand for country and industry …xed e¤ects. The main coe¢ cient of interest in the literature is b and the method of estimation is least squares. 3
To understand the relationship between the least-squares estimator of b in (5) and in (1), which is the parameter of interest, it is useful to rewrite the least-squares estimator in terms of demeaned data (e.g., Baltagi, 2008)
where y is the average of y in across industries and countries; y i the average of y in for industry i; y n the average of y in for country n; z U S the average of z iU S ; and x the average of x n . The
where Corr(z U S ; z n ) Corr(z iU S ; z in jn):
The Case of Attenuation Bias
It follows from (7) that the benchmarking estimator b b used in cross-industry cross-country empirics will be attenuated (biased towards zero) if and only if 0 < 1 + 1; equivalently using (8)
For example, this will be the case if the index of technological similarity with the US is the same for all countries and technological industry characteristics in the US therefore proxy equally well for technological industry characteristics in all other countries, Corr(z U S ; z n ) = > 0. In this case, b b a = where plays the role of the reliability ratio in the classical measurement error model (e.g. Wooldridge, 2002) .
A somewhat more general su¢ cient condition for b b to be biased towards zero is that the index of technological similarity with the US, Corr(z U S ; z n ), is decreasing in the country characteristic x n , but that Corr(z U S ; z n )x n is increasing in x n (if the latter condition is not satis…ed, the benchmarking estimator may have the wrong sign). 4 Substituting (1) into (6) and taking the probability limit as I ! 1 of the numerator yields
The probability limit of the denominator when substituting (1) into (6) is V ar(z U S ) 1 N X n (x n x) 2 : Hence, the probability limit of (6) is +
de…ning Corr(z U S ; z n ) Corr(z iU S ; z in jn) and making use of (4) and V ar(z U S ) = V ar(z ) + 2 can be written as in (7) and (8).
The Case of Ampli…cation Bias
But the benchmarking estimator b b can yield estimates of that are biased away from zero (ampli…ed). From (7) and (8) it follows that this will be the case if and only if > 0 or equivalently (10)
The left-hand side of the inequality in (10) turns out to be the standard formula for the least-squares slope of a regression of Corr(z U S ; z n )x n on x n . Hence, the condition for an ampli…cation bias in (10) is equivalent to a least-squares slope greater unity when regressing
Corr(z U S ; z n )x n on x n . For this to be the case, the index of technological similarity of country n with the US, Corr(z U S ; z n ), must be strictly increasing in the country characteristic x n over some range.
To develop some intuition for the ampli…cation bias, it is useful to rewrite the model in
(1) in terms of two equations
The country-speci…c slope parameters n capture cross-country di¤erences in how industry outcomes covary with industry characteristics. For example, in Rajan and Zingales (1998) these slope parameters would capture cross-country di¤erences in the covariation between industry growth and the external-…nance dependence of industries. In Nunn (2007), the slope parameters would capture cross-country di¤erences in the covariation between industry exports and the relationship-speci…c input intensity of industries.
Now imagine estimating the country-speci…c slopes n in (11) with least squares using US industry characteristics z iU S as a proxy of industry characteristics z in . The resulting least-squares slopes b n re ‡ect the covariation between industry outcomes in country n and US industry characteristics z iU S . Substituting the least-squares slopes b n in (6) yields that the benchmarking estimator can be expressed as the least-squares slope of a regression of the country-speci…c slope estimates b n on the country characteristics x n
: 5 5 To see this, note that the least-squares estimates of the country-speci…c slopes expressed in terms of Similarly, the probability limit of the benchmarking estimator b b a can be written as the least-squares slope when regressing b a n on x n
Equation (14) shows that the bias of the benchmarking estimator will re ‡ect how the bias of the country-speci…c least-squares slopes covaries with the country characteristic x n . As a result, the ampli…cation bias can arise even if all country-speci…c slope estimates are attenuated because of classical measurement error, as long as the attenuation bias is weaker for countries with greater x n .
A setting where countries fall into two groups The ampli…cation bias emerges most clearly in a setting where countries except the US fall into two groups, A and B, and countries in the same group are identical. In this two-group setting, (13) simpli…es to
That is, the benchmarking estimator is simply the slope of the line connecting the two points
Making use of (15), the probability limit of (16) is
where Corr(z U S ; z A ) Corr(z iU S ; z in jn) for all countries n in group A and Corr(z U S ; z B ) is de…ned analogously. There is an ampli…cation bias if and only if the term in parenthesis is greater than unity. The simplest way to see that the ampli…cation bias can be very large is to consider the case where where (i) countries in group A have the same technological characteristics as the US and US industry characteristics therefore proxy perfectly for industry characteristics of these countries, Corr(z U S ; z A ) = 1, but (ii) countries in group B have technological characteristics that di¤er from the US to the point where US industry characteristics are uncorrelated with industry characteristics of these countries, Corr(z U S ; z B ) = 0.
In this case, (17) simpli…es to
Hence, there will be an ampli…cation bias if x A > x B > 0 and the bias will be very large if the two groups of countries have very similar characteristics x. This is because in this case there is a strong positive association between the country characteristic x n and technological similarity with the US. Figure 1 illustrates the true model and the estimated model in the two-group setting for > 0. In …gure 1A, we graph the true country-speci…c slopes A and B against x A and x B . As n = x n , the true parameter of interest is simply the slope of the line connecting the two points (x A ; A ) and (x B ; B ). In …gure 1B, we also graph the probability limits of the country-speci…c slope estimates b a A and b a B against x A and x B . Equation (17) implies that the probability limit of the benchmarking estimator b b a is simply the slope of the line connecting the two points (
. The ampli…cation bias b b a > > 0 follows because US industry characteristics are a perfect proxy for industry characteristics of countries in group A, which implies b a A = A ; but do not proxy for industry characteristics of countries in group B, which implies b a B = 0 < B : More generally, the ampli…cation bias of the benchmarking estimator arises when the attenuation bias of the country-speci…c slope estimates (which re ‡ects technological dissimilarity with the US) is su¢ ciently stronger for countries that are less similar to the US in the country characteristic x. 
Notes: True country-speci…c slopes (bold circles) and estimated country-speci…c slopes (…lled circles) in the two-group model where the benchmarking estimator is biased away from zero (ampli…cation bias). There is ampli…cation bias although the country-speci…c slope estimates are weakly biased towards zero (attenuated).
Estimating Comparative Advantage Models with a Benchmarking Estimator
The (standard) benchmarking estimator of the empirical cross-industry cross-country literature has been used widely to investigate the determinants of comparative advantage in international trade (e.g. Romalis, 2004; Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007; Manova, 2008 Manova, , 2013 Cuñat and Melitz, 2012) . In this context, there turns out to be a new benchmarking estimator that yields a lower bound on the strength of comparative advantage under the assumption that at least one pair of countries di¤ers in the direction of comparative advantage. We …rst illustrate the argument in a model of comparative advantage where all countries except the US fall into two groups and countries in the same group are identical. A special feature of this setting is that the new benchmarking estimator turns out to be identical to the (standard) benchmarking estimator used in the literature. Then we discuss the new benchmarking estimator in a more general setting (where the new benchmarking estimator is no longer identical to the benchmarking estimator used in the cross-industry cross-country literature).
Model and Assumptions
It is useful to rewrite (without loss of generality) the country characteristic x n in (11) and (12) as x n = q n q . This yields
q n is the country characteristic that may determine a country's comparative advantage and q the value of q n where comparative advantage switches from high-z industries to low-z industries as long as 6 = 0. We can obtain a lower bound on the strength of comparative advantage under two assumptions. The …rst assumption, which is standard in the comparative advantage literature using the cross-industry cross-country approach, is that high-z
industries in the US also tend to be high-z industries elsewhere. The second assumptionwhich will turn out to be testable -is that there is at least one country on either side of the threshold q . Formally:
(A1) High-z industries in the US tend to be high-z industries elsewhere, Corr(z U S ; z n ) > 0.
(A2) There is at least one country on either side of the threshold q , that is (q n q )(q m q ) < 0 for at least one pair of countries n, m. Or equivalently, as long as 6 = 0, at least one country has a comparative advantage in high-z industries and at least one country has a comparative advantage in low-z industries.
A setting where countries fall into two groups To illustrate why these two assumptions allow for a benchmarking estimator that yields a lower bound on the true strength of comparative advantage, we return to the setting where countries except the US fall into two groups and countries in the same group are identical. A special feature of this setting is that the new benchmarking estimator turns out to be identical to the (standard) benchmarking estimator used in the literature. We can therefore illustrate the argument using the standard benchmarking estimator and postpone the introduction of the new benchmarking estimator.
As shown above, in the setting where countries except the US fall into two groups and countries in the same group are identical, the key formulas for the (standard) benchmarking estimator b b used in the cross-industry cross-country literature simplify to (16) and (17).
The benchmarking estimator b b will be attenuated and therefore yield a lower bound on the true e¤ect , if and only if the term in parenthesis on the right-hand side of (22) is strictly greater than zero but smaller than unity. This is equivalent to 6
and
Both conditions will be satis…ed if assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold. To see this, notice that because countries in the same group are identical, assumption (A2) is equivalent to (q A q )(q B q ) < 0: Combined with assumption (A1), this implies that the left-hand side of (23) is strictly negative while the right-hand side is positive. Assumptions (A1) and (A2) also imply that the left-hand side of (24) is negative while the right-hand side is positive.
Hence, assumptions (A1) and (A2) imply that the term in parenthesis on the right-handside of (22) is strictly greater than zero but smaller than unity and that the benchmarking estimator b b will be biased towards zero: When US industry characteristics are an imperfect proxy for industry characteristics of countries in group A or group B; the inequality in (24) will be strict and the benchmarking estimator b b will be strictly biased towards zero: Figure 2 illustrates the true model and the estimated model for > 0. In …gure 2A, we graph the true country-speci…c slopes A and B against q A q > 0 and q B q < 0. As n = (q n q ), the true parameter of interest is simply the slope of the line connecting the two points. In …gure 2B, we also graph the probability limits of the country-speci…c slope estimates b a A and b a B against q A q and q B q . According to (22), the slope of the line connecting these two new points yields the probability limit of the benchmarking estimator b b a : As b a A > 0 and b a B < 0 are biased towards zero, it follows that the line connecting the country-speci…c slope estimates must be less steep than the line connecting the true country-speci…c slopes. Hence, b b a is biased towards zero (attenuated). For < 0 the argument is analogous. 6 To derive the conditions in (23) and (24), it is convenient to write the term in parenthesis in (22) as 1 = 2 . As long as q A 6 = q B , the condition 0 < 1 = 2 1 is equivalent to 1 2 > 0, which is the condition in (23), and
is the condition in (24). is biased towards zero. From the …gures it becomes clear that this is because in …gure 2B, there are countries on both sides of q and these countries di¤er in the direction of their comparative advantage. As a result, the line connecting the country-speci…c slope estimates in …gure 2B is a clockwise rotation of the line connecting the true country-speci…c slopes.
Figure 2A: True Model
Hence, b b a is necessarily biased towards zero.
A New Benchmarking Estimator
There continues to be a benchmarking estimator yielding a lower bound on the true strength of comparative advantage associated with country characteristic q n in (19) and (20) when there are many di¤erent countries (but this estimator is no longer the benchmarking estimator used in the cross-industry cross-country literature). To show this, we start with the case where it is known which countries are on the same side of q . Or equivalently as long as 6 = 0, the case where it is known which countries have a comparative advantage going in the same direction. Then we turn to the case where the grouping of countries by the direction of their comparative advantage is unknown.
Known Country Grouping
If it were known which countries are on the same side of q , we could put countries on one side of q into group A and countries on the other side of q into group B. Then we could estimate the strength of comparative advantage associated with country characteristic q n using the following new benchmarking estimator
where b A and b B denote the average country-speci…c slope estimate for countries in group (25) is biased towards zero this general case also, and the new benchmarking estimator therefore continues to yield a lower bound on the strength of the true e¤ect. To see this, we …rst obtain the probability limit of (25) using (15), which yields
where Corr(z U S ; z nA )(q nA q ) is the average of Corr(z U S ; z nA )(q nA q ) across countries n in group A and Corr(z U S ; z mB )(q mB q ) is de…ned analogously for countries m in group B. (26) implies that the new benchmarking estimator will be attenuated and therefore yield a lower bound on the true e¤ect, if and only if the term in parenthesis is strictly greater than zero but smaller than unity. This turns out to be equivalent to 8
Both conditions will be satis…ed if assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold. To see this, notice that the left-hand side of (27) is strictly negative as Corr(z U S ; z nA ) > 0, Corr(z U S ; z mB ) > 0;
and at least one pair of countries di¤ers in the direction of their comparative advantage, (q nA q )(q mB q ) < 0; and the right-hand side of (27) is positive as countries in the same group have the same direction of comparative advantage, (q nA q ) (q A q ) 0
and (q mB q ) (q B q ) 0: A similar argument yields that the left-hand side of (28) is negative while the right-hand side is positive. Hence, the term in parenthesis in (26) is strictly greater than zero but smaller than unity and the grouping estimator b b G is biased towards zero. When US industry characteristics are an imperfect proxy for industry characteristics in at least one country where q n 6 = q , the inequality in (28) will be strict and the new benchmarking estimator b b G will be strictly biased towards zero. Figure 3 illustrates the true model and the estimated model for > 0. In …gure 3A,
we graph the true country-speci…c slopes n against q n q with each circle representing a country. As n = (q n q ), the true parameter of interest is the slope of the line through the circles. In …gure 3B, we also graph the probability limits of the country-speci…c slope estimates b a n against q n q . All country-speci…c slope estimates are biased towards zero. This means that we underestimate the country-speci…c slopes for countries with comparative advantage in high-z industries and we overestimate the country-speci…c slopes for countries with comparative advantage in low-z industries. As a result, the new benchmarking estimator b b G -which according to (26) is the slope of the line connecting the average country-speci…c slope estimate for countries with comparative advantage in high-z industries with the average country-speci…c slope estimate for countries with comparative advantage in low-z industries -will necessarily be biased towards zero. For < 0, the argument is analogous.
A 2SLS Interpretation
The new benchmarking estimator in (25) turns out to have an interpretation as a 2SLS estimator applied to the cross-industry cross-country model (30) y in = n + i + bz iU S q n + residual in :
To see this, de…ne an indicator function 1 n that assigns a value of 1 to countries in group A and a value of 0 to all other countries (or the other way round). Now we can estimate (30) using 2SLS with the product of the indicator function and the US industry characteristics z iU S 1 n as an instrument for the interaction term z iU S q n . This 2SLS estimator can be expressed in terms of demeaned data as
where the b n are the country-speci…c least-squares slopes estimated using US industry characteristics as a proxy for industry characteristics in all other countries and 1 = 1 N X n 1 n . It is now straightforward to show that the right-hand side of (31) is the same as the right-hand side of (25) and hence b b G;2SLS = b b G .
Estimated Country Grouping
The 2SLS estimator in (31) cannot be implemented directly because we generally do not know whether countries have a comparative advantage in high-z or low-z industries. As a result, we cannot generate the necessary indicator function 1 n . But it turns out that we can estimate 1 n consistently under the (testable) assumption 6 = 0. As shown in Wooldridge (2002, Section 6.1.2), the 2SLS estimator using a consistently estimated instrument is not only consistent but has the same asymptotic distribution as the 2SLS estimator using the actual instrument under weak conditions. Hence, we can obtain an estimate with the same asymptotic distribution as b b G;2SLS by estimating the cross-industry cross-country model in (30) with 2SLS and instrumenting z iU S q n with z iU S b 1 n where b 1 n is a consistent estimator of 1 n . We now discuss two approaches to obtain such a consistent estimator. A simple approach that only relies on the sign of the country-speci…c slope estimates and a second, somewhat more complex, approach that also considers the country characteristic shaping the direction of comparative advantage.
Simple Approach The …rst estimator, which we refer to as b 1 1n ; is an indicator that takes the value of 1 for countries n with b n 0 and the value of 0 for all other countries. Recall that b n converges to b a n = n Corr(z U S ; z n ) = (q n q )Corr(z U S ; z n ), where we made use of (15) and (20) . Hence, as long as 6 = 0; assumption (A1) implies that b a n has the same sign for countries on the same side of q and b 1 1n is a consistent estimator of 1 n : The hypothesis = 0 can be tested, as it implies that n = 0 for all countries n: We can therefore proceed in three steps. First, estimate the least-squares slopes b n and test the hypothesis n = 0 for all n: Second, if this hypothesis can be rejected, obtain the estimate of the indicator function for each country b 1 1n . Third, estimate the model in (30) with 2SLS using z iU S b 1 1n as an instrument for z iU S q n .
Alternative Approach There is a second, somewhat more complex, approach to obtain a consistent estimator of the indicator function 1 n . This approach di¤ers from the …rst approach in that it also uses information on the characteristics q n that may be driving countries'comparative advantage. To see the basic idea, suppose that > 0 and that (20) holds. In this case, countries with q n q have a comparative advantage in high-z industries and countries with q n < q have a comparative advantage in low-z industries. The idea of the approach is to estimate q and then group countries according to whether q n is above or below q . Estimating q would be simple if we observed n : We could chose a value b q that maximizes the share of countries with q n b q and n 0 plus the share of countries with q n < b q and n < 0. This can be thought of estimating q so as to maximize the share of countries whose direction of comparative advantage conforms to (20). Once we have obtained the threshold b q we could generate the indicator function 1 n by assigning a value of 1 to countries n with q n b q and a value of 0 to all other countries. This approach would yield a unique indicator function, although the threshold b q would not be unique, as the data for the country characteristic q n are discrete. If one wants to ensure a unique threshold also, this can be easily done by choosing b q from the set of values taken by the country characteristic q n . An analogous approach can be used to obtain b q when < 0. If we observed n , we could chose a threshold b q from the set of values taken by the country characteristic q n that maximizes the share of countries with q n b q and n 0 plus the share of countries with q n < b q and n > 0. This can again be thought of as estimating q to maximize the share of countries whose direction of comparative advantage conforms to (20) .
In practice, we generally neither observe the n nor do we know whether > 0 or < 0. But instead of the n we can use the least-squares estimates b n , as their sign is a consistent estimate of the direction of countries'comparative advantage under assumption (A1). That we do not observe whether > 0 or < 0 can be taken care of by choosing either the threshold estimated under the assumption > 0 or the threshold estimated under the assumption < 0, depending on which yields a greater share of countries whose direction of comparative advantage conforms to (20) . Summarizing, the alternative approach generates a consistent estimate of the indicator function 1 n by splitting countries into two groups based on an estimate of the threshold q . This estimate is obtained by maximizing the share of countries whose estimated direction of comparative advantage conforms to (20).
To explain the second approach more formally, we need to introduce a considerable amount of notation. Let Q be the set that collects the values of q n for all countries n. De…ne p( qj q 2 Q) as the share of countries with q n q and a comparative advantage in high-z
industries plus the share of countries with q n < q and a strict comparative advantage in low-z industries, (32) p( qj q 2 Q) = share of countries with q n < q and n < 0 q n q and n 0 :
Also de…ne m( qj q 2 Q) as the share of countries with q n q and a comparative advantage in low-z industries plus the share countries with q n < q and a strict comparative advantage in high-z industries (33) s(qj q 2 Q) = share of countries with q n < q and n > 0 q n q and n 0 :
Let q Q be the value q 2 Q such that countries with q n q Q have a comparative advantage going in the same direction and countries with q n < q Q also have a comparative advantage going in the same direction. If > 0, q Q is straightforward to determine as it is the unique value maximizing p( qj q 2 Q): Similarly, q Q is also straightforward to determined if < 0,
as it is the unique value maximizing s( qj q 2 Q). Collecting the cases > 0 and < 0 it follows that as long as 6 = 0; we can determine q Q as
To see this, notice that if > 0, max p( qj q 2 Q) = 1 while max s( qj q 2 Q) = 0 except if there are countries that happen to have a value of q n exactly equal to q ; in this case, max s( qj q 2 Q) = M=N with N the number of countries and M the number of countries with q n = q . On the other hand, if < 0, max s( qj q 2 Q) = 1 while max p( qj q 2 Q) = 0 except if there are countries that happen to have a value of q n exactly equal to q ; in this case, max p( qj q 2 Q) = M=N .
Using (34), we can obtain a consistent estimator of q Q once we have consistent estimators of p(q) and s(q). Moreover, consistent estimators of p(q) and s(q) are straightforward to …nd under assumption (A1). In this case, b a n 0 if and only if n 0, see (15). Hence, we can obtain consistent estimators b p(q) and b s(q) of p(q) and s(q) by replacing n by b n in (32) and (33): Then we can replace p(q) and s(q) by b p(q) and b s(q) in (34) to obtain a consistent estimator b q Q of q Q . Finally, we can obtain our alternative consistent estimator of 1 n as the indicator function b 1 2n that assigns a value of 1 to all countries n with q n b q Q and the value of 0 to all other countries (or the other way around).
Applying the 2SLS Grouping Estimator
We now illustrate the alternative benchmarking estimator in the context of Nunn's (2007) empirical analysis of the e¤ect of contract enforcement on comparative advantage in industries that depend more on relationship-speci…c intermediate inputs (see also Levchenko, 2007, and Costinot, 2009 , for related empirical and theoretical …ndings). Nunn's analysis is based on the cross-industry cross-country model (35) ln e in = a n + a i + bz iU S q n + residual in where ln e in is the log value of exports of country n in industry i; q n the quality of contract enforcement in country n; and z iU S a measure of industry i's dependence on relationship-speci…c intermediate inputs obtained using US data. Nunn's key …nding is that b is positive and statistically signi…cant, indicating that countries with better contract enforcement export relatively more in industries that depend more on relationship-speci…c intermediate inputs.
To apply our 2SLS benchmarking estimator, we …rst need to estimate the country-speci…c slopes n = bq n in (36) ln e in = n + i + n z iU S + residual in :
The least-squares slope estimates b n tell us how much more country n exports in industries that depend more on relationship-speci…c intermediate inputs. We plot these estimates against the quality of contract enforcement q n in …gure 4. The second step is to use the least-squares slope estimates b n to test the hypothesis that = 0 (by testing whether n = 0 for all n). This hypothesis is rejected at any conventional con…dence level. The third step is to use the least-squares slope estimates to obtain the two indicators b 1 1n and b 1 2n that group countries by the direction of their comparative advantage. 9 We can then obtain an estimate of the e¤ect of better contract enforcement on exports in relationship-speci…c input industries by applying 2SLS to (35) and instrumenting the interaction z iU S q n with z iU S b 1 1n , z iU S b 1 2n , or both. We proceed using both instruments simultaneously as this is the most e¢ cient approach. Using Nunn's baseline speci…cation (in his Table IV) , this yields a standardized beta coe¢ cient of 0:361 with a standard error of 0:015. Nunn's estimate using the standard cross-industry cross-country benchmarking estimator is 0:289 with a standard error of 0:013. Hence, our new benchmarking estimator -which provides a lower bound on the strength of the true e¤ect under assumptions (A1) and (A2) -yields that better contract enforcement is even more important for exports in relationship-speci…c input industries than the estimator of the cross-industry cross-country literature. 
Conclusion
Cross-industry cross-country models are used extensively in economics. The approach has attractive features, like its focus on theoretical mechanisms and the possibility to control for country-level determinants of economic activity. But there are also drawbacks. Implementation requires specifying technological industry characteristics that are generally unobservable and must therefore be proxied with industry characteristics in a benchmark country. That this can lead to an attenuation bias is unsurprising. What appears to not be understood is that using data from a benchmark country to approximate industry characteristics elsewhere can also lead to a (large) ampli…cation bias when technologically similar countries are similar in other dimensions.
A main area of application of cross-industry cross-country models is international trade, where these models have been used to examine the e¤ects of factor endowments and institutions on comparative advantage. We show that in this context there is an estimator that yields a lower bound on the true e¤ect, as long as some countries di¤er in the direction of their comparative advantage. Rajan and industry sensitivity to ex-country receipts of foreign industries more sensitive to exchange rate appreciations manufac-Subramanian change rate appreciation aid grew relatively more slowly in countries receiving larger turing growth (2011) [industry ratio of exports to aid inflows value above or below the median] 37 international Aizenman and industry dependence on exter-portfolio equity, debt, and equity inflows have negative aggregate growth impact but financial Sushko (2011) nal finance FDI inflows in country c at positive impact in more financially constrained industries; flows and time t FDI inflows have positive impact, both at the aggregate growth level and more external finance dependent industries
